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This article investigates the idea of µWKH VRFLDO¶ LQ (XURSH DIWHU WKH 8.
V (8
Referendum vote, with reference to the 'European social model'. It is argued that the 
key drivers of the vote outcome did not feature in the referendum campaign but are 
features of longer running and deeper fractures in both British and wider European 
society. Especially, the lack of response to societal problems, the downplaying of 
individual participation, and a crisis in democracy created by an increasingly 
neoliberal direction within an EU concerned with austerity and social control, 
contrary to the values of the 'European social model' (Walker, 2005). In the absence 
RIDFWLRQIRUEHWWHUµVRFLDOTXDOLW\¶WKLVRYHUDOOQHROLEHUDOGLUHFWLRQKDVDOVRZHDNHQHG
the progressive and integrative potential of social policy. The result is the regressive 
nationalist populist backlash against neoliberal technocracy. Instead, we argue that 
answers to contemporary European challenges must focus on improving social 
quality and democracy. 
 
Key words: Brexit     European social model      Populism     Social dimension      Social 
quality 
 
Introduction 
This article considers the idea of the European social model, which originally intended 
to distinguish a dual concern with both economic development and social progress. It 
discusses how this rhetorical device, despite its potential, has been colonised by the 
neoliberal imperative to reduce all societal concerns to economic ones (even though 
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the EU has always been primarily an economic project). It is argued that the lack of a 
FOHDU GHILQLWLRQ RU WKHRUHWLFDO GHSWK WR µWKH VRFLDO¶ LQ WKH (XURSHDQ VRFLDO PRGHO LV
partly to blame for the strong tendency towards neoliberalism. Social quality is then 
introduced, which theorises the social, and is a democratic concept. Following this, the 
Brexit Referendum is discussed: societal dislocation (brought about by neoliberal 
economic policy), and the resurgence of a regressive nationalist populism are cited as 
key drivers behind the vote. As set out in the introduction to this Themed Section, we 
understand populism to be the adoption of rhetoric by political actors, which 
FKDUDFWHULVHVWKHµHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶Rr political, economic or cultural elites, as a threat to 
DQ HQYLVLRQHG µKHDUWODQG¶ (Taggart, 2004), though not all opposition to elites is 
populist (Müller, 2016). In right-wing versions of populism, there is anger with elite 
JURXSV HVSHFLDOO\ WKRVH HVSRXVLQJ µVRFLDO OLEHUDO¶ YDOXHV EXW WKLV DQJHU LV DOVR
directed downwards at marginal groups in society, such as refugees, criminals, and 
unemployed people. Finally, we consider how adopting a social quality approach may 
realise the potential for a European social model and oppose both further technocratic 
neoliberalism or the descent into xenophobia and national protectionism.  
 
7KHµ(XURSHDQVRFLDOPRGHO¶DQGWKe neglect of the social 
7KH
(XURSHDQVRFLDOPRGHO
LVDµFRQWHVWHGLGHDO¶ZKLFKODFNVDFOHDUGHILQLWLRQLQ(8
policy (Whyman et al., 2012). It is largely an adjunct to the economic and trade-
focused project of building the European single market (Whyman et al., 2012; 
Vanhercke et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the European social model idea is an important 
'political intervention', attributed to Jacques Delors in the early 1980s, which was 
intended to 'strengthen the rather fragile European identity' and to promote Europe 
as an alternative to Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalisms, and the managerial capitalism of 
Japan (Hermann, 2017, p.59). It can be distinguished from the minimalist and 
individualist neoliberal approach to social policy in the United States (US) and 
increasingly, other Anglo-Saxon countries, and instead, denotes a more social 
democratic basis for policy and society (Gough, 1998; Whyman et al., 2012; Hermann 
and Hofbauer, 2007). The EU is similar to the US and other large trading blocs in its 
commitment to developing economic integration, but what sets the EU apart is the 
loosely defined social dimension (Walker, 2005). There is some debate about multiple 
European social models - especially in distinguishing between Western Europe, 
Northern and Southern Europe, and the post-2004 accession countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, in a similar vein to comparative welfare regimes. One interpretation 
of a singular European social model includes attention to minimum rights and decent 
working conditions, a broadly universal and high degree of social protection, dialogue 
and compromise between societal actors (including businesses, trades unions, 
political actors, and citizens), inclusivity of labour markets, the provision of public 
services, and a focus on solidarity, guided by the concepts of social inclusion and social 
cohesion (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2015).  
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 For its adherents, the European social model is seen as a brake on the 
remorseless global ideology of neoliberalism. It seeks to counter societal destruction 
created by financialization and global flows of capital, at least within Europe. This is 
in contradistinction to the impulses of liberal capitalist societies, especially in the 
Anglo-Saxon world. The UK has long been considered a liberal welfare state, with an 
overarching governmental preference for market solutions to welfare issues, residual 
social protection, and minimal, often means-tested support, as in Esping-Andersen's 
(1999) tripartite typology of welfare states. Yet, the UK's 'social model' has also been 
termed 'liberal collectivism', due to its hybrid approach that has retained some 
LPSRUWDQWDVSHFWVRIVRFLDOGHPRFUDF\DQGWKHQRWLRQRIWKHµSXEOLFUHDOP¶VXFKDVWKH
expectation that the state has, at least, some public responsibilities (Clarke, 2004; 
Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012). The failure to fully adopt the social democratic model 
during the Keynesian postwar period, rendered the UK's welfare state and social policy 
approach a 'mutation', situated somewhere between the extreme liberal model of the 
US and the more 'social' European models (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p.87). As a 
consequence of the absence of a clear commitment to the principles of the European 
social model, the UK has been particularly amenable to the influence of neoliberal 
ideology and policy over the past forty years. 
 The 1997- µ1HZ /DERXU¶ JRYHUQPHQWV DWWHPSWHG WR 
JUDIW
 DVSHFWV RI D
more European-style level of social support and investment onto their individualist, 
pro-market, low-tax neoliberal approach, by deferring the costs of public expenditure 
through policies such as Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) and outsourcing (Whitfield, 
2001). This had negative consequences for solidarity, and to the claims to be social 
democratic by those governments (Hermann and Mahnkopf, 2010). The post-2010 
Conservative-led governments have renewed the extreme neoliberal project to 
residualise social protection and furthered the use of the welfare state  as social control 
for µGHYLDQW¶SHRSOH*ULPVKDZDQG5XEHU\+DUULVRQDQG6DQGHUV 2015). Under 
WKH JXLVH RI µQHFHVVDU\¶ DXVWHULW\ FXWV DQG ILVFDO FRQWURO &RQVHUYDWLYH JRYHUQPHQWV
have sought to move the UK closer to the US model (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011), 
and to strip away social protection, notably for unemployed people, disabled people, 
and families with more than two children, but not for older people and the richest 1%.   
The European social model may have been more of a weak rhetorical device 
than a metatheory or specific policy approach. However, Whyman et al. (2012) argue 
that there have been benefits for workers in the UK and other low regulated countries 
that have adopted even a minimalist version of the European social model, for 
example, from the social chapter and the working time directive. While, on the one 
hand, EU law protects some social rights from neoliberal austerity cuts, EU 
competition law also hinders reversing the tendency towards opening-up public 
services to private contractors (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012). Contrary to the ideals of 
the European social model, the EU has also been susceptible to the corrosive influence 
of neoliberal thinking, politics and policy, while UK governments, especially 
Conservative oQHVPXVWWDNHVRPHRIWKHEODPHDVWKHµHQHP\ZLWKLQ¶LQWHUPVRI(8
social policy. While the term emerged from European political elites, societal 
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development, as part of a common European identity, has been historically struggled 
for by working class movements, trade unions, and social democratic and socialist 
political parties (Hermann and Mahnkopf, 2010). Along with the gradual decline in 
the influence of these three factors in the ongoing process of European integration, 
political elites have increasingly favoured a more neoliberal direction, including the 
liberalisation of trade, weakening of social protection and welfare states, protection of 
multinational corporations, and the privatisation and marketisation of public services 
under the aegis of 'competitiveness' (Hermann and Mahnkopf, 2010). Rather than the 
compromise of a 'socially-embedded market project', 'social concerns' became 
subordinated to neoliberal economic imperatives and integrationist politics, 
particularly after 2008 (Jones and O'Donnell, 2017). This continues today, with the 
µFHQWULVW¶)UHQFK3UHVLGHQW0DFURQVHHNLQJWRZHDNHQZRUNHUV¶ULJKWVDQGWUDGHXQLRQ
power. While Daly (this issue) argues that member states retain a degree of domestic 
control over national social policies, this overall neoliberal direction has shaped the 
development of EU countries and limited the policy options open to governments. 
For example, limits to deficit spending according to the Growth and Stability 
Pact have long prohibited member states from adopting a more interventionist 
Keynesian approach, and this has a knock-on effect in encouraging a reduction of 
public sector liabilities, such as privatised hospitals in Germany and PFI hospitals in 
the UK (Hermann and Mahnkopf, 2010). Instead of an adjunct to economic 
imperatives, the social dimension has become dependent upon economic integration 
and fiscal rules (Copeland and Daly, 2015). In the post-crisis period, the EU has moved 
further away from the notion of economic stimulation towards a technocratic model 
of financial consolidation, invoking both austerity and structural change, and focused 
on preventing and correcting the behaviours of states that do not adhere to its fiscal 
rules (Hermann, 2017). This has had particularly negative outcomes for southern 
European states, such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain. 
As a result, it has been argued that in pursuing neoliberal economic reforms, 
the EU has deepened a longer-term process of 'Americanization' (Wincott, 2003), with 
the UK in particular strongly in favour of this process, and generally opposed to the 
aims of the European social model. Therein lies the rub; at this present juncture, the 
EU Referendum result marginally in favour of Brexit, appears to have been a result of 
disillusionment with the outcomes of neoliberalism over the past three decades, as 
much as of the EU itself. As discussed below, the dominant narrative of the Leave 
campaign marshalled a nationalist and protectionist populism - taking back control - 
DJDLQVW WKH WHFKQRFUDWLF DQG PHGGOLQJ µXQGHPRFUDWLF (XURFUDWV¶ LQ %UXVVHOV 7KLV
sleight of hand by the Leave campaign was despite the ultra-neoliberal leanings of 
some of the most prominent Brexiteers and reflects the trenchant opposition of 
7KDWFKHULWHVWRWKHµVRFLDOGLPHQVLRQ¶RIWKH(XURSHDQ Project (Wincott, 2003). 
Both EU and British elites must both shoulder some of the blame for the 
outcome of the Referendum. Despite the politics of European integration, a major 
SUREOHPRIWKHLGHDORIWKH(XURSHDQVRFLDOPRGHOUDWKHUOLNHµVRFLDOSROLF\¶LWVHOILV
WKDW WKH QRWLRQ RI µWKH VRFLDO¶ LQ WKHVH GLVFRXUVHV LV SRRUO\ GHILQHG DQG DUWLFXODWHG
5 
 
(Corbett and Walker, 2017). The remit of social policy historically has been viewed as 
public policies that aim for improvements in social welfare: social policy is defined as 
µDFWLRQVDLPHGDWSURPRWLQJVRFLDOZHOO-EHLQJ¶$OFRFNHWDOS$V+LOO
notes other definitions commonly use welfare as a synonym for well-being. This 
perspective emphasises the redistributional core of social policy, usually focusing on 
the institutional and organisational dimensions, but underplays the overarching 
FRQFHSWRIµWKHVRFLDO¶7KLVKDVKDGLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKH8.DQG(XURSH 
,QGHHG WKH QHROLEHUDO GLUHFWLRQ RI WUDYHO KDV SULRULWLVHG D µFXOWXUH RI
individuDOLVP¶ZKLFKKDVGRZQSOD\HGWKHFROOHFWLYLVDWLRQRIULVNDQGFXOSDELOLW\LQWKH
state, and emphasised individual responsibility and self-reliance. As argued by Jordan 
(2006) neoliberal governments preferred personal debt in the form of bank loans and 
credit, rather than using the tax-EHQHILWV\VWHPµ6RFLDO¶ZHOIDUHWKHQEHFRPHVDVLPSOH
aggregate of individual welfares in a market context. The political project to rapidly 
enlarge the EU, which overlooked the underdevelopment in social policy terms of most 
of the candidate states, has exacerbated the tendency towards neoliberalism, as well 
as helping to provoke a crisis in EU solidarity over migration. One of the motivations 
behind strong Conservative support for enlargement was likely to have been a watering 
down of the social dimension. 
While we have portrayed the social model in positive terms, as a counterweight 
WRQHROLEHUDOHFRQRPLVPDQGWKHEDVLVIRUWKH(8¶VFODLPEHIRUHHQODUJHPHQWWREHD
distinct form of capitalism, there is a negative side too. 7KH (8¶V VRFLDO PRGHO
UHLQIRUFHG DQ LQWURVSHFWLYH µIRUWUHVV (XURSH¶ SHUVSHFWLYH ZKLFK RSHUDWHG LQLWLDOO\
against enlargement towards the post-communist bloc Eastern and Central European 
countries because of their poor performance in social policy terms (Ferge, 1998). They 
were also in the grip of neoliberal inspired reforms, which were further undermining 
their social provision. With the neoliberal turn in EU policy making inadequate social 
provision was no longer a bar to membership. Now the fortress mentality is directed 
externally, as signalled by the migration crisis. Even in some of the most progressive 
expressions of the European social model ideal, such as by the Comite des Sages 
(1996), social citizenship is very definitely European rather than global. 
 
$µVRFLDOTXDOLW\¶DSSURDFKWR(XURSHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHRULVLQJ
µWKHVRFLDO¶ 
The concept of social quality emerged from debates during the 1990s on the social 
dimension of Europe, fuelled by concerns that they were taking a neoliberal 
economistic direction (Beck et al., 1998). The intellectual stimulus  was that, despite 
debate about the social dimension, the nature of 'the social' had never been explicitly 
defined, and as a consequence has been neglected in favour of 'the economic', which 
echoes a longstanding critique of economism from within the social policy tradition 
(Titmuss, 1963; Walker, 1984).  
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Unlike other concepts largely concerned  with individual quality of life, such as 
social capital, happiness, capabilities, and subjective well-being, social quality is 
concerned with the quality of societies, in particular the societal conditions of socio-
economic security, social inclusion, social cohesion, social empowerment, and social 
sustainability. While the individual and society are components of social quality 
(Phillips, 2011), although the conception of the social does not render them as 
opposed, in a duality, but rather, sees both as constitutive components of the social. 
The social is therefore not the mere aggregate of individuals but exists in a dialectical 
relationship between individual self-realisation and the formation of collective 
identities over time. Social quality includes a theoretical model of the social, which is 
the substance of society and includes within it communities, groups, networks and 
family relations, systems, institutions and organisations, rules and cultural norms, 
along with individual people, whose lives, their interactions and individual 
biographies, are in part shaped by ± and help shape - broader societal processes (Van 
der Maesen and Walker, 2012). These aspects are in tension and out of their dialectical 
relations, society is produced, reproduced, and changed. Therefore, social quality has 
a comprehensive theoretical and sociological grounding that goes beyond approaches 
centred on individual well-being (Phillips, 2006).  
This important distinction draws attention to the promise of social quality in 
considering the role of societal structures, institutions, and processes, and the 
interdependency of human beings, without discarding the importance of individual 
freedom and autonomy, recognition and identity, capability and capacity. As Sayer 
(2011) points out, the value of freedom is only one part of human lives and is often 
characterised in masculinist and liberal individualist terms. Instead, we are 
understood as social beings, often dependent on others, we live through others, and 
rely on the care of others, and vice-versa, throughout our lives (Sayer, 2011). As a 
result, humans are conceptualised in social quality terms as social beings constituted 
by the social, for whom meaningful participation in society is fundamental. This 
concern is reflected in the definition of social quality: µthe extent to which people are 
able to participate in social relationships under conditions which enhance their well-
EHLQJFDSDFLWLHVDQGSRWHQWLDO¶9DQGHU0DHVHQDQG:DONHUS:KLOHWKH
definition includes individuals and their concern with their own well-being, it also 
recognises that this is impossible without societal relations (Walker, 2009, p.210).  
Certain societal conditions must obtain for people to have meaningful 
opportunities to participate in society, and to do so on terms that develop their 
capacities and provide realistic chances for human flourishing. In other words, a socio-
economically secure, cohesive, inclusive, empowering, and sustainable societal context 
LQZKLFKSHRSOH¶VOLYHVWDNHSODFHLVMXVWDVLPSRUWDQWDVSHRSOH¶VDFWXDODJHQF\DQG
DELOLWLHV7KLVLVLQFRQWUDVWWRWKHGLUHFWLRQRIPXFKQHROLEHUDOLQVSLUHGµVRFLDO¶SROLF\
and economic policy in recent years (Clarke, 2004; Deeming, 2016; Corbett and 
Walker, 2017), which for example, rewards the powerful and wealthy through 
favourable inheritance and tax regimes, while simultaneously micro-managing and 
controlling the weakest and poorest members of a society by using the welfare state to 
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µQXGJH¶JRRGEHKDYLRXUZLWKKDUVKVDQFWLRQVWKHSHQDOW\IRUIDLOLQJWo comply (Corbett 
and Walker, 2013; Crouch, 2016). In making sense of this, social quality theory has an 
overarching normative aim: to facilitate action in the form of the transformation of 
material conditions in ways that increase the possibilities for better realising the social 
and achieving greater meaningful participation in society.  
Initially, then President of the European Commission Romano Prodi wrote in 
the Foreword to the second book on social quality that the democratic essence of the 
approach iV EDVHG µRQ SDUWQHUVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH (XURSHDQ LQVWLWXWLRQV WKH 0HPEHU
States, regional and local authorities and civil society. Quality conveys the sense of 
H[FHOOHQFH WKDW FKDUDFWHUL]HV WKH (XURSHDQ VRFLDO PRGHO¶ LQ %HFN HW DO  ,Q
practice, however, there has been only minimal adoption of social quality thinking in 
European policy-making (for example the emphasis on the quality of employment). 
Instead, we have seen the dominance of neoliberal ideas, epitomised by the response 
to the 2008 financial crisis by many European states in adopting publicly-funded 
bailouts for banks and the deterioration of public services, stagnating wages and 
increasingly insecure work for many people. These are the societal pre-conditions 
which have proved fertile for the rise of nationalist populism and the mainstreaming 
of anti-EU sentiment that helped to produce Brexit. An alternative approach ± 
focusing on the primacy of social quality and participation is discussed in the final 
section. 
 
The Brexit vote 
Much of the political right in the UK, and some sections of the left, have held a long-
UXQQLQJRSSRVLWLRQWRWKH(8YLHZLQJLWUHVSHFWLYHO\DVD µFRPPXQLVW¶EXUHDXFUDWLF
PRQROLWK RU DV D FDSLWDOLVW µERVVHV¶ FOXE¶ 7KH 0DDVWULFW 7UHDW\¶V  DLP RI
developing political and economic convergence, however, invoked the trenchant 
opposition of particularly the right of the Conservative Party and the right-wing media. 
The failure of pro-EU politicians to counter the visceral hatred of the right, and that of 
thH (8 WR DFWLYHO\ SURPRWH LWV µVRFLDO GLPHQVLRQ¶ KDV SUROLIHUDWHG D JHQHUDOLVHG
antipathy towards the EU. British (specifically, English) Euroscepticism towards 
European integration has a long legacy (Forster 2002). The establishment of the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) in the 1990s was part of the clamour on the right for 
Brexit. This put anti-EU discourses firmly on the political agenda, assisted by regular 
media appearances of then UKIP leader, Nigel Farage.  
Most European citizens have retained a commitment to national identity while 
also supporting economic integration within Europe (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). 
However, the UK has generally been characterised by ambivalent Euroscepticism 
connected to nostalgia for %ULWDLQ¶VJOREDOUROHWKHLPSDFWRI:orld War II on national 
consciousness, and national economic decline (Gifford, 2008). Of all current 28 EU 
PHPEHU VWDWHV WKH %ULWLVK SXEOLF DUH WKH OHDVW OLNHO\ WR LGHQWLI\ DV µ(XURSHDQ¶
(Dennison and Carl, 2016). Opposition to the European project, and European elites 
more generally, is not solely restricted to the UK, but also includes Euroscepticism in 
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other countries, as evidenced by the Danish rejection of Maastricht in 1992 (but with 
VXEVHTXHQW DFFHSWDQFH DQG ,UHODQG¶V LQLWLDO UHIHUHQGXP UHMHFWLRQ of the Lisbon 
Treaty (Leconte, 2010). In addition, far right populist parties have doubled their vote 
over the past ten years across different countries (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Such 
parties often pledge to oppose European integration and the free movement of people 
in defence of national sovereignty, hard borders, and often xenophobia and racism, in 
Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark (Balorda, this issue), France (Lux, this issue), 
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Poland. In the cases of Hungary and Poland 
in particular, this has taken the form of governments that are opposed to 
cosmopolitanism and the neoliberal economic model, in favour of populist 
nationalism and economic protectionism (Nölke, 2017). 
Despite generalised Euroscepticism, the 2016 EU Referendum emerged chiefly 
because of internal divisions within the governing Conservative Party, under electoral 
pressure from UKIP on the right. Prior to forming a Coalition after the 2010 election, 
David Cameron had attempted to move the ConservativeVRQIURPµEDQJLQJRQDERXW
(XURSH¶LQRSSRVLWLRQZLWKVRFLDOO\OLEHUDOUKHWRric (Corbett and Walker, 2013). µ1HZ
/DERXU¶ JRYHUQPHQWV had pursued further neoliberal-influenced economic 
integration, particularly the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, while remaining outside the 
Eurozone, and blocking further workplace legislation beyond the social chapter 
(Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2017). Inward migration increased during this 
period as new member states joined the EU and Southern European member states 
experienced economic crises (Kilkey, 2017). However, once the Conservatives were in 
RIILFHLQ&DPHURQ¶VUHSRVLWLRQLQJFRDOHVFHGDVWKHIOLPV\µELJVRFLHW\¶FRQFHSW
which appealed only to self-help and community action, while adopting a very harsh 
YHUVLRQRI µDXVWHULW\¶ LQVHHNLQJ WRUHWUHQFK WKHVRFLDO UROHRI WKHVWDWH &RUEHWWDQG
Walker, 2013). With an increased intake of Eurosceptic MPs in 2010, and the rise of 
8.,3RQWKHULJKW&DPHURQSOHGJHGWRKROGDVLPSOHLQRXWUHIHUHQGXPRQWKH8.¶V
EU membership, should the Tories return a majority at the 2015 election. With this 
surprise majority achieved, Cameron set about providing a renegotiated µLQ¶
relationship with the EU, loosely relating to restricting migrant benefits, preventing 
further political integration and safeguarding the City of London from a proposed 
financial transaction tax.  
The weight of the British political and economic establishment was behind the 
5HPDLQFDVHGXEEHGµ3URMHFW)HDU¶LQLWVGLUHZDUQLQJRIWKHFRVWVWRWKH8.HFRQRP\
and individual household finances of leaving the EU. This campaign reflected a 
technocratic neoliberal understanding that a rational economic analysis of the EU 
would swing voters behind remain, without seeking to argue positively for the 
European project at all. Meanwhile, other influential political and media elites 
supported the eventually victorious Leave campaign. With the backing of the majority 
RIWKH%ULWLVKQHZVPHGLD5HXWHUV/HDYHHQJDJHGLQDQHPRWLYHDQGµSRVLWLYH¶
campaign that adopted nationalist populism in emphasising British sovereignty, with 
WKHHPSRZHULQJVORJDQµ9RWH/HDYHWDNHFRQWURO¶7KHFDPSDLJQ¶VGHILQLQJLPDJHDOVR
referred to a form of cost/benefit argument and linked this to a fundamental social 
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institution, with the deliberate misrepresentation of the costs of EU membership 
advertised on the side of a red busµZHVHQGWKH(8PLOOLRQDZHHNOHW¶VIXQGRXU
1+6>1DWLRQDO+HDOWK6HUYLFH@LQVWHDG¶ 
Analysis of the vote points to a deeply divided society with several cleavages. 
Underpinning factors are argued to be simmering anger as a result of the problems of 
insecure, flexible labour markets, declining wages and increased competition for jobs 
(Goodwin and Heath, 2016; Clegg, 2017), or identities and cultural values (in 
particular, social liberalism versus social conservatism) (Kaufman, 2016), or in 
broader terms, a combination of divisions along the lines of inequality and cultural 
differences (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Winlow et al., 2017). Some of the analysis and 
GHEDWHIRFXVHVRQWKHQRWLRQRIWKHµOHIWEHKLQG¶YLHZHGLQVRFLR-economic terms as 
those who have not benefitted from the processes of neoliberal globalisation (Clarke 
et al., 2017). Goodwin and Heath's (2016) aggregate and individual analysis of voting 
patterns delineates a greater preference for a leave vote among poorer, older, less-
educated voters in areas that have experienced post-industrial decline; the so-called 
µOHIWEHKLQG¶ 
7KH µOHIW EHKLQG¶ FRQFHSW KRZHYHU UHWDLQV WKH QHROLEHUDO WHUPV RI
µPRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶ DQGHFRQRPLFJOREDOLVDWLRQ DV LPSOLFLWO\EHQHILFLDO IRUSHRSOH7KLV
discourse is viewed as relying on 'stereotypes and prejudices that the poor white 
working class are "old fashioned", un-modern, have no mobility and long for the past', 
rather than a more systematic analysis of the structures of deindustrialisation, class 
inequality and class prejudice (Mckenzie, 2017, p.208). Instead, Mckenzie (2017) 
GHVFULEHVSHRSOHDVEHLQJµOHIWRXW¶RIVRFLHW\UDWKHUWKDQµEHKLQG¶ZKLFKKDVSURGXFHG
much of the anger and perception of societal unfairness in the eyes of many Leave 
voters in her ethnographic research in London and the Midlands. The Referendum 
vote reflected the decline of community solidarity in many ex-industrial towns and 
cities in the UK over the past 30 years, along with a blunt articulation of anger and 
frustration at having been 'left out' and ignored (or treated with contempt) by political, 
economic and media elites in the UK and elsewhere during this time (Mackenzie, 
2017). This sense of disempowerment is an important point, which we return to below. 
2WKHU DQDO\VHV SRLQW WR FRPSOH[LW\ LQ EHLQJ µOHIW EHKLQG¶ RU µOHIW RXW¶ DQG LWV
H[SUHVVLRQLQWKHUHIHUHQGXP$V,VKNDQLDQWKLVLVVXHVWDWHVWKHµOHIWEHKLQG¶FRQFHSW
also misses the fluidity of insecurity and precariousness today, where many of those 
involved in social movements, such as Occupy; younger, urban, mobile, multicultural, 
often highly educated, have also borne the brunt of neoliberal austerity and the 
consequences of globalisation. However, overall this latter group is more likely to have 
voted remain in the Referendum, reflecting the contradictory nature of the neoliberal 
impulse and societal concerns within both the EU and the UK. Antonucci et al. (2017) 
suggest that, despite these divisions, key drivers for Leave voters were increased 
financial insecurity and a relative decline in economic position, which has affected 
both poorer working class and middle-income groups, older and younger people. Both 
of these conditions are linked to neoliberal austerity policies (though rarely recognised 
as such) (Dorling, 2016). For lHDYHYRWHUVJHQHUDOO\µ>S@UR-remain discourses simply 
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PDGHQRVHQVH«DVWKH\ZHUHIXQGDPHQWDOO\GLVVRFLDWHGIURPVXFKUHDVRQLQJRQDQ\
HFRQRPLFSROLWLFDORUHPRWLRQDOOHYHO¶0FNHQ]LHS:LWKRXWDQ\SRVLWLYH
articulation of the societal benefits of membership of the EU (or rather, its potential), 
it was the case that, for all the Remain campaign's 'Project Fear' over what would 
KDSSHQWRWKH%ULWLVKHFRQRP\LI WKHFRXQWU\ OHIW WKLVGLGQ¶WPDWWHUDJUHDWGHDOWR
those who felt they already had little or nothing left to lose. This also suggests that, 
rather than being a 'left behind' residue of excluded people unable to adapt to 
modernity, the structures that create inequality and precarity (Dorling, 2016; 
Antonucci et al., 2017), and the decline of the social under neoliberal austerity, are key 
issues post-Brexit. 
 
Against technocratic neoliberalism and nationalist populism: social 
quality, participation and the deepening of democracy 
Fraser (2017) has argued that the 2016 US Presidential Election represented a 
+REVRQ¶V FKRLFH EHWZHHQ µSURJHVVLYH QHROLEHUDOLVP¶ &OLQWRQ DQG µUHDFWLRQDU\
SRSXOLVP¶7UXPS1HLWKHUGLDJQRVLVFDQEHJLQWRDGGUHVVWKHVRFLHWDOSUREOHPVRI
inequality, precarity, and declining solidarity that the US, like Europe, faces. There are 
VLPLODULWLHVLQWKHXQIROGLQJ%UH[LWFULVLVZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWVKLIWLQJEHWZHHQµVRIW
%UH[LW¶DQGµKDUG%UH[LW¶SRVLWLRQVPart of the success of the Leave campaign was to 
extend the 'austerity-logic' of recent UK governments with the argument that 'we 
cannot afford the European Union', encapsulated by the infamous red bus NHS 
funding claim (Cooper and Whyte, 2017, p.1). 'Austerity' is an extension of the 
neoliberal logic to characterise any form of public spending as 'unproductive' 
(Mendoza, 2014). This is a continuation of the downplaying of traditional social policy 
values in the neoliberal period but it has also increased disillusionment with and 
distrust in democratic politics and institutions. This in turn provides fertile ground for 
the continuation of populist rhetoric and deepening divisions in society.  
It is clear that both the EU and the UK cannot continue to adopt technocratic 
and anti-democratic neoliberal approaches if either are to learn from the experience 
of Brexit, even where some policy concessions for these problems are made, whether 
WKURXJK GHYHORSLQJ D µSLOODU RI VRFLDO ULJKWV¶ RU WHQWDWLYH PRYHV WR EHWWHU LQFOXGH
migrants and refugees in European society. As Klein (2017, p.94) puts it '[f]ear of "the 
other" may be an animating force for many supporters of far right parties, but 
"inclusion" of the other within an inherently unjust system will not be powerful enough 
to defeat those forces'. The regressive march of nationalist right-wing populism as a 
response to distant elitism is opening up spaces for the far right to articulate a 
narrative of the post-financial crisis world: porous borders, migration, refugees, 
cultures of entitlement, social liberalism, and multiculturalism are to blame for poor 
jobs, and crumbling public services and welfare states. In the context of the rise of the 
far right, without systemic changes, these tensions cannot be addressed (Winlow et al., 
2017).  
11 
 
In its response to Brexit, The European Trade Union Confederation has 
advocated an end to the primacy of market imperatives in the EU, over social and 
employment protection, even arguing for an end to further integration unless the 
µVRFLDOGLPHQVLRQ¶LVSULRULWLVHGµless Europe until PRUHVRFLDO¶*XPEUHOO-McCormick 
and Hyman, 2017, p.181). This represents a shift in tone towards a more 
confrontational approach with the existing structures of the EU, while seeking to 
emphasise cross-national co-operation rather than competition. More co-operative 
and democratic European institutions are desired, rather than the distant, top-down 
and technocratic approach of the EU (and national governments) in the neoliberal 
period, and this suggests increased attention to changes in the material conditions of 
European society to realise this shift. A deepening of democracy at all levels from local 
to national to supra-national is necessary to ensure genuine opportunities for 
participation and empowerment, and to counter disillusionment and the lure of 
nationalist populism. We argue that a social quality approach should be the impetus 
for this transformation. 
The social quality approach provides a vehicle for the realisation of a more 
social Europe.  As noted already it is, conceptually and practically, in contradiction to 
neoliberal individualism and can begin to engage with material inequalities and the 
sense of social dislocation that many feel. It is also a democratically orientated concept. 
Part of its original rationale was to respond to the so-callHG µGHPRFUDWLF GHILFLW¶ E\
emphasising the essential role of social relationships and institutions (including EU 
ones) in the empowerment of citizens. This critical role has been neglected in 
WUDGLWLRQDO µWRS-GRZQ¶ VRFLDO SROLF\ DQG IHDWXUHV QRZKHUH LQ QHRliberalism, beyond 
shallow market consumerism. Furthermore, it is envisaged that local communities 
might employ the instrument to engage in assessments of social quality and go on to 
compare the outcomes of those of other communities and countries. This process 
might generate community participation and democratic involvement as citizens 
begin to benchmark social progress, or lack of it. Moreover, social quality could help 
to provide the conditions for a new form of participatory social policy, by developing 
more participative democratic institutions through which citizens of EU member 
states can meaningfully articulate their needs and preferences, and shape the 
development of social policies (see Beresford, 2016; Beresford and Carr, 2018). 
The social quality approach encourages a more sophisticated view of the zero-
sum power relationship between the EU and its member states promoted by right wing 
populist rhetoric (Corbett, 2016). In fact, while European integration in the economic 
and monetary fields has meant diminished national sovereignty, this is matched by 
growing interdependence. In the social field national competencies remain formally 
intact, although there is also growing interdependence. The adoption of a social quality 
approach would help to balance the longstanding disparity between the economic and 
the social in EU policy. Finally, although developed in Europe, social quality has global 
relevance and might be a way of transcending the fortress mentality. By giving priority 
to societal concerns ovHU HFRQRPLF JURZWK ZKLFK KDV IDLOHG UHSHDWHGO\ WR µWULFNOH
GRZQ¶DVDPHDVXUHRISURJUHVVUHTXLUHVHQKDQFLQJWKHFRQGLWLRQVRIVRFLR-economic 
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security, social cohesion, social inclusion, social empowerment, and social 
sustainability. This also requires opportunities for meaningful participation beyond 
the fleeting feeling of power experienced by leave voters in the referendum, which 
might end the distrust and disillusionment with democracy, and revitalize a sense of 
genuine democratic empowerment. Various strategies for greater democratic 
participation and universalist politics are being espoused by the Democracy in Europe 
Movement 2025 (DieM25), and there is a long legacy of citizen participation through 
participatory budgeting and participatory economic SODQQLQJ-RQHVDQG2¶'RQQHOO
2017). Serious engagement with these institutional innovations in democracy are 
required to enable a sense of meaningful participation in society that is socially 
empowering, and to avoid either elite technocracy or populist division.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has engaged with the failed promise contained in the idea RIWKHµ(XURSHDQ
VRFLDOPRGHO¶ZKLFKZDVVXSSRVHGWRGLVWLQJXLVKDSDUWLFXODU(XURSHDQFRQFHUQZLWK
both economic development and societal progress. In the development of the EU, and 
especially since 2008, this concern has given way to a neoliberal impulse that 
prioritises economic imperatives and ignores societal concerns. This has reached its 
latest crisis with austerity and the Brexit vote. Much of the antagonism towards Europe 
on the part of Brexiteers and other national populists is not driven by personal 
experience of the impact of specifically EU policies (except in the case of Greece) or 
any in-depth knowledge of the EU itself, but by deeper social, economic and cultural 
divisions and legitimate grievances. Two decades ago the EU itself recognised the 
danger ahead as a result of the Danish Referendum. A Reflection Group established by 
WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQSDUJXHGWKDWµPHQDQGZRPHQRI(XUope today, 
more than ever, feel the need for a common project. And yet, for a growing number of 
Europeans, the rational for Community integration is not self-evident. This paradox is 
DILUVWFKDOOHQJH¶7KHQWKHDXWKRULWDWLYH&RPLWpGHV6DJHVSput it in blunt 
WHUPVµ(XURSHZLOOEHD(XURSHIRUHYHU\RQHIRUDOOLWVFLWL]HQVRULWZLOOEHQRWKLQJ¶
Thus the failure of Europe itself to take action to bolster its social dimension and build 
more democratic forms of participation is a major factor in the recent rise of anti-
European politics. 
The stronghold gained by right-wing national populists poses an existential 
threat to European social values and social democracy, a threat that is demonstrated 
by Brexit. While it may be too late for the UK, which is being forced down the US road 
of social policy residualisation, this is not yet the case for the rest of Europe. As a 
matter of urgency the EU should adopt a principled social quality framework (as set 
out in the appendix) and, through it, give much greater emphasis at all levels in Europe 
to the daily lives of citizens and how their social quality is determined. Of paramount 
importance are policies to promote socio-economic security, social cohesion, social 
inclusion, social empowerment, and social sustainability through meaningful 
democratic participation and participatory social policy. EU and national policy 
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makers should also use this framework to join-up the presently fragmented policy 
domains, especially the economic and social, in order to make a concerted attack on 
the inequality, poverty, exclusion and precarity that both negate equal citizenship and 
create fertile ground for far right populist rhetoric and division. At the same time, the 
solidaristic and inclusive principles within the social quality idea should be the basis 
on which the EU confronts and deals with the appalling human tragedies created by 
wars and the complete absence of social quality in many African countries. 
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